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Abstract
We develop a dynamic model of identity formation that explains why ethnic minori-
ties may choose to adopt oppositional identities (i.e. some individuals may reject or
not the dominant culture) and why this behavior may persist over time. We ﬁrst show
that the prevalence of an oppositional culture in the minority group cannot always
be sustained in equilibrium. Indeed, because the size of the majority group is larger,
there is an “imposed” process of exposition to role models from the majority group
that favors the diﬀusion of mainstream values in the minority community. In spite of
this, an oppositional culture in the minority group can nevertheless be sustained in
steady-state if there is enough cultural segmentation in terms of role models, or if the
size of the minority group is large enough, or if the degree of oppositional identity it
implies is high enough. We also demonstrate that the higher the level of harassment
and the number of racist individuals in the society, the more likely an oppositional
minority culture will emerge. We ﬁnally show that ethnic identity and socialization
eﬀort can be more intense in mixed rather than segregated neighborhoods.
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1Bengali, bengali / Bengali, bengali / No no no / He does not want to depress you/
Oh no no no no no / He only wants to impress you / Oh.. Bengali in platforms /
He only wants to embrace your culture / And to be your friend forever. [‘Bengali
in Platform,’ Morissey, Viva Hate, 1988, Reprise/Wea]
1 Introduction
In April 1992, when a mostly white jury acquitted four police oﬃcers accused in a videotaped
of beating a black motorist, thousands of people in Los Angeles, mainly young black and
Latino males, joined in what has often been characterized as a race riot. In the summer of
2001, ethnic riots occurred on the streets of towns and cities in the north of England (e.g.,
Oldham, Leeds, Burnley, Bradford), involving young British Asian men. More recently, in
November 2005, riots emerged in Paris’ suburbs, sparked by the accidental deaths of two
Muslim teenagers, and then spread to 300 French towns and cities. Most of the rioters were
the French-born children of immigrants from Arab and African countries.
These race and ethnic riots1 have all recently placed the issue of racial and ethnic identity
at the forefront of political debate in the United States and in Europe. Identity is the result
of an individual’s choice, often the choice not to conform to the accepted norms but rather
to diﬀerent norms that characterize a social, ethnic, or religious group.2 Furthermore, ethnic
identities can be “oppositional”, that is, they require the rejection of the accepted norms of
the majority group (Ainsworth-Darnell and Downey, 1998). This is the case, for instance, of
the so-called “ghetto culture” in the United States (Wilson, 1987). Also, studies in the US
have found that African American students in poor areas may be ambivalent about learning
standard English and performing well at school because this may be regarded as “acting
white” (Delpit, 1995; Fordham and Ogbu, 1986; Ogbu, 1997; Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005;
Selod and Zenou, 2006; Battu et al., 2007; Fryer and Torelli, 2010).3
1But also the terrorist attacks in the U.S. and Europe (September 11, the March 2004 Madrid train bomb-
ings, the July 2005 London bombings), the killing of the author of a documentary about Muslim immigrants
by a young Dutch-Moroccan in Amsterdam on November 2004, the riots in many Muslim communities in Feb-
ruary 2006 after the publications of vignettes representing the prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper,
and several others.
2In this perspective, identity is related to conformity. Identity and conformity are nonetheless clearly
distinct. Preferences for conformity in fact limit the choice of individuals, inducing them to conform e.g., to
social norms of behavior (see e.g., Bernheim, 1994, and Akerlof, 1997).
3Such extreme preferences amongst ethnic group members may also stem from a lack of economic oppor-
tunity, discrimination or they may stem from a desire to display greater racial or religious solidarity (Akerlof
and Kranton, 2000). Ihlanfeldt and Scaﬁdi (2002) evoke a wish to share culture, prejudice against whites,
2Oppositional identities often produce signiﬁcant economic and social conﬂicts, as in the
case of the ethnic and race riots cited above. But how intense are oppositional identities?
Which economic and sociological factors mostly contribute to their formation? In particular,
does neighborhood segregation induce intense and oppositional identities? In this paper we
attempt to provide some answers to these questions.
A large literature in economics, sociology and anthropology, documents how ethnic traits
are transmitted from parents to children and how ethnic identity is adopted (see, in particu-
lar, Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Alba, 1990; Bernal and Knight, 1993; Boyd and Richerson,
1985, Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Phinney, 1990). In our reading of the evidence, par-
ents directly make various socialization choices, e.g., the rules and beliefs the family conforms
to and how much time they spend with their children. Parents also realize that socialization
is partially the product of the social interaction their children engage into, which they aﬀect
by choosing which neighborhood to live in, the school children attend, their social circle of
friends and acquaintances, the civic/social clubs and churches they belong to, etc. The role
of parents in the socialization of their own children is nonetheless limited by the children’s
pro-active role in choosing who to imitate and learn from, thereby directly shaping their
own cultural identity. An individual’s general identity, in the words of Akerlof and Kranton
(2000, p. 720), “is bound to social categories; and individuals identify with people in some
categories and diﬀerentiate themselves from those in others.”
We model the formation of ethnic traits along these lines, that is, as a mechanism that
interacts cultural transmission and socialization inside the family,4 peer eﬀects and social
interactions, and identity choice.
To be more precise, our model has three main components:
(i) Trait transmission from parent to child:
In period t, the child adopts his parent’s identity with some probability, which a positive
function of parental eﬀort τi. Parent also chooses the intensity of their own identity αi. The
parent’s choice of τi is determined altruistically, but with “imperfect empathy” in that the
parent evaluates the child’s future well-being as if the child has picked up the same trait
or expectations of unfavorable treatment by whites against non-whites in white neighborhoods. One could
also think of the advantages that members of a minority group can derive from locating close to one another,
thereby improving their access to ‘ethnic goods’ such as food, education or religious service, not to mention
the ability to socially interact in their own language (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005).
4See Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) for a formal study of cultural transmission, and Bisin, Topa, and
Verdier (2004), Cohen Zada (2003), Jellal and Wolﬀ (2002), and Patacchini and Zenou (2011a) for empirical
studies of cultural transmission and socialization of, respectively, religious traits, altruism, and preferences
for education.
3(oppositional or mainstream) as the parent himself.
(ii) Trait transmission from role model to child:
In the absence of successful parental transmission, the child can adopt the trait of a
randomly picked role model in the society at large. In this perspective, d represents the
“segmentation” of society, which captures the populations from which a minority role model
is chosen from. When d = 1, the role model is drawn from society at large. When d = 0 the
role model is drawn only from the minority population.
(iii) Child’s determination of the intensity of his trait, or his own identity:
Last, the intensity with which the child identiﬁes himself with his trait is chosen by
the child, along with a “good” or “bad” action. These two choices are referred to as an
“identity choice.” Choosing an identity of any kind is costly (denoted by C(αi)). But having
a strong identity reduces psychological cost of interacting with others. The optimal choice of
action is predetermined by assumption (mainstream individuals chooses the “good” action,
oppositional ones chooses the “bad” action) but the optimal choice of intensity of identity
will depend on Qi, the probability of interacting with someone of a diﬀerent type, and Ii,
the psychological cost of this interaction. As a result, Qi × Ii is the expected psychological
cost of interacting with someone with a diﬀerent value system.
We ﬁrst show that the prevalence of an oppositional culture in the minority group (i.e.
individuals who reject the mainstream values) can be sustained if and only if there is enough
cultural segmentation in terms of role models, and/or the size of minority group is large
enough, and/or the degree of oppositional identity it implies is high enough, and/or the
socio-economic opportunity cost of the actions it prescribes is small enough. In this steady-
state equilibrium, the socialization eﬀort of oppositional parents is higher than that of the
mainstream minority families. There is indeed an asymmetry between the two cultural
traits, “mainstream” and “oppositional”. Since the majority group individuals are by def-
inition mainstreams, there is an “imposed” process of exposition to role models from that
group.5 This tends, quite naturally, to favor the diﬀusion of the mainstream values into the
minority community. Given that, in order to have a long run constant fraction of opposi-
tional individuals, it has to be the case that their family socialization eﬀort compensates
for this asymmetric cultural bias. However, when the “imposed” socialization through the
majority cultural model is strong enough, then there is no way for the oppositional culture to
survive and there is, in that case, full assimilation of the minority group to the mainstream
values.
We then show that it is possible (and we identify suﬃcient conditions on economic funda-
5This is referred to as the meeting bias in favor of the majority group (whites) in Currarini et al. (2009).
4mentals) that ethnic identity and socialization eﬀort are more intense in mixed rather than in
segregated neighborhoods. As a result, our analysis suggests that the eﬀect of mixed neigh-
borhood on identity formation and socialization might be quite complex and may generate
in some cases perverse results. This is particularly so if mixed neighborhood are conducive
of explicit acts of rejection on the part of the majority group.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the contribution of our
paper with respect to the literature. In Section 3, we present the main model. Section 4
deals with the cultural equilibrium analysis and some comparative statics results. Section 5
is devoted to the justiﬁcation of our assumptions and modelling choices. In Section 6, we
introduce the possibility of harassment of the minority group. Section 7 considers the joint
cultural evolution of both racist or intolerant majority preferences and oppositional minority
culture. Finally, Section 8 concludes, provides some empirical evidence and discusses some
policy issues.
2 Background and previous literature
Our model is linked to several literatures that we would like to discuss now.
2.1 Modeling ethnic identity
A ﬁrst feature of our model is the way we model ethnic identity. There are in fact diﬀerent
ways of modeling (ethnic) identity. Identity is a concept widely used in other disciplines but
it is relatively new to economics. If we think of individual identity, then individuals will care
about their own self-image. People have a desire to feel good about oneself, or hold onto a
particular view of oneself (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Koszegi, 2006). If we think of social
identity, then individuals care about their own self-image but their self-image depends on
who they are within the society, which, in turn, depends on the established social norms
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2010).6 This view is related to the social identity theory in
social psychology (Tajfel, 1981; Turner, 1982). Feeling good about oneself depends on how
you understand your social identity. To be more precise, Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2010)
incorporate the psychology and sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior. In
the utility function they propose, identity is associated with diﬀerent social categories and
how people in these categories should behave. Their results suggest that people belong to
6Davis (1995, 2003, 2004) and Sen (1999, 2000, 2004) were among the ﬁrst along with Akerlof and Kranton
(2000, 2010) to introduce identity in economics.
5certain groups and wish to adopt the corresponding social identity by behaving according to
the behavioral prescriptions of these groups. More recently, Horst et al. (2007), Kirman and
Teschl (2004, 2006) have extended this notion of identity by proposing their own analysis
of the economic agent’s identity, which is motivated not by the self-interested choices, but
by achieving consistency between one’s characteristics and one’s desired self-image through
participation in diﬀerent social groups.
To summarize, in the social identity literature, there are psychological costs from failing
to conform to one’s own group identity. If we think of ethnic identity, the “acting white”
phenomenon mentioned in the introduction is a good example of this. This is similar to the
conformity models (see, among others, Akerlof, 1980; Akerlof, 1997; Ballester et al., 2006;
Battu et al., 2005; Bernheim, 1994; Glaeser and Scheinkman, 2001; Kandel and Lazear, 1992;
Fershtman and Weiss, 1998; Patacchini and Zenou, 2011b) where it is failing to conform to
own group identity that is costly. In some other models, (e.g. Shayo, 2009), the psychological
cost comes from comparing the status of one’s own group with that of another.
In our model, the psychological cost arises from interactions with others (diﬀerent type),
regardless of whether they are from the same group or not. For example, a very integrated
(i.e. assimilated) ethnic minority will have a cost of interacting with a person from the same
ethnic group if the latter has a much stronger ethnic identity. In the case of acting white, a
very assimilated African American will have a cost of interacting with an African American
having a strong “black” identity because they have diﬀerent values. The former may like to
study and have good grades and thus may suﬀer to interact with the latter who will accuse
him of acting white and thus reject his behavior.
This view of identity is relatively known in the non-economic literature. These ideas
have been expressed by the theories of multiculturalism (Glazer and Moynihan, 1970; Taylor
and Lambert, 1996), and conﬂict (Bobo, 1999). According to this view, the group iden-
tity formation is a sort of cultural distinction mechanism that allows individuals to reduce
the psychological costs associated with cultural diﬀerences. In economic terms, the con-
cept of cultural distinction can be motivated in terms of negative social interactions across
individuals belonging to diﬀerent identiﬁed groups or types.
2.2 Neighborhood eﬀects
A second feature of our model is that neighborhood matters since if the transmission of
identity from parents fails, then the child picks up his “trait” from the neighborhood where he
lives. Neighborhood models a la Bénabou (1993) and Durlauf (2004), for example, consider
the dynamics of neighborhood formation as they interact with income determination via
6neighborhood eﬀects on education. The logic of social interactions in a group appears very
explicitly in models such as Durlauf (1996). This latter paper explores the dynamics of
income inequality by studying the evolution of human capital investment and neighborhood
choice for a population of families.
This class of models is conceptually similar to our analysis. We extend this logic in new
directions, but our idea is not per se original. Indeed, our model makes diﬀerent assumptions
in that majority group members can have adverse eﬀects on minority group members whereas
the neighborhood models assume that rich neighbors always beneﬁt poor ones. And the
neighborhood models endogenize the neighborhood memberships. But the conceptual logic
is quite similar.
2.3 Dynamic models of identity formation
A third feature of our model is the fact that identity formation is not static and depends
on the dynamic of neighborhood composition where the child lives. There are, in fact, few
models that analyze the dynamic of identity formation. Horst et al. (2007) and Bénabou
and Tirole (2011) are notable exceptions.
Horst et al. (2007) explore the idea of an agent’s personal identity of which his social
identity is one aspect and in which the evolution of peoples’ identities is stochastic. Their
concept of identity is on a more personal level and suggests that people have desired self-
images of themselves that they wish to attain at some time in the future. Hence, individuals
aim to transform their current individual characteristics into those of their self-image. They
try to achieve this by joining social groups and adopting the typical characteristics of these
groups. However, groups will be modiﬁed over time by the people joining them. This may
induce individuals to revise their previous choices and eventually to move on and to choose
diﬀerent groups. The model thus presents an endogeneous interaction structure and oﬀers
an account of endogenous group formation as well as an endogenous evolution of personal
identity.
Bénabou and Tirole (2011) develop a theory of moral behavior, individual and collective,
based on a general model of identity in which people care about “who they are” and infer
their own values from past choices. They can explain escalating commitments, in which
someone who has built up enough of some economic or social asset —wealth, career, family,
culture, etc.— continues to invest in it even when the marginal return no longer justiﬁes
it. Intuitively, a higher stock raises the stakes on viewing the asset as beneﬁcial to one’s
long-run welfare, and the way to reassure oneself of its value is to keep investing. This leads
to excessive specialization (e.g., work versus family) and persistence in unproductive tasks.
7Most strikingly, one can even be made worse oﬀ by a higher capital stock, as the escalating-
commitment mechanism leads to a treadmill eﬀect in which increases in wealth, social status,
or professional achievement induce a self-defeating pursuit of the belief that happiness lies
in the accumulation of those same assets. Their model also sheds light on oppositional
behaviors. When two identities are likely to compete later on for time or resources, investing
in one depreciates the perceived value of the other. An agent with substantial capital vested
in an insecure, hard-to-measure identity (e.g., cultural attachments) may therefore refrain
from proﬁtable investments in others (education, labor market integration), and even destroy
valuable assets, ending up worse oﬀ.
Compared to these two approaches, the dynamic of identity formation in our model is
quite diﬀerent. Indeed, children receive an identity trait (in our model either “oppositional”
or “mainstream”) and then must decide how intense their identity within that trait is by
trading oﬀ the costs of such an action with the beneﬁts of it due to the reduction of the
expected psychological cost of interacting with someone of a diﬀerent value system. The
dynamics of our model comes from the evolution over time of the fraction of the population
with a certain trait (“oppositional” or “mainstream”), which depends on parental’s eﬀort in
transmitting that trait and the identity intensity choice from the children.
2.4 Theoretical models of oppositional identity
Finally, our model is also related to the small theoretical literature on the formation of
oppositional identities. Using their deﬁnition of ethnic identity (see above), Akerlof and
Kranton (2010, Chap. 8) are able to explain why some blacks do reject the whites’ norm and
why some don’t. In their framework, the losses in identity utility for a black to be an insider
(i.e. to integrate and join the dominant majority) is the lack of acceptance by whites. This
black person who decides to be an insider is denied self-respect because he does not ﬁt the
insider racial ideal (which is to be white). There are also losses in identity utility for a black
to be an outsider (i.e. adopt an identity in opposition to the insiders). In that case, he loses
self-respect not because of rejection by whites but because her outsider ideal tells him he
should not be working for (or cooperating with) whites. Finally, there are externalities since
a black worker who chooses to be an insider loses utility when other black workers chose to
be outsiders (and vice versa). This model can explain why some blacks may reject the white
ideal by, for example, dropping out of school at an early stage because it is rational to do so
when the alternative is working in the white world and not being successful, which entails a
great loss of utility.
Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) propose an alternative explanation by focussing on the
8tension faced by individuals between signalling their type to the outside labor market and
signalling their type to their peers: signals that induce high wages can be signals that induce
peer rejection. Also Battu et al. (2007) show that some ethnic minorities may reject the
white norm even if it implies a penalty in the labor market because they enjoy a high utility
by being part of their group. Finally, De Martí and Zenou (2010) assume that two individuals
from the same community always face a low linking cost of forming a relationship while the
inter-community cost diminishes with the rate of exposure of each of them to the other
community. Using the recent developments of network theory, they show that oppositional
identity patterns can arise for a wide range of parameters, even when the inter-community
costs are high.
Compared to this literature, we have three main contributions. First, all the models cited
above are static and explain how and sometimes why an oppositional culture emerges. Here,
we go further by explaining not only how and why but also the dynamics and persistence of
oppositional identities. This is our ﬁrst contribution and it is important for policy purposes
because it can explain why, after three or four generations, North-African children in France
are still not well-integrated and cause riots. Our second contribution consists in modelling
parents’ transmission of identity. Indeed, in our framework, not only peers’ but also parents’
investment are crucial to understand ethnic minority identity choices. Once more, this is
important for policy purposes because it means that mixing people of diﬀerent ethnicities can
backﬁre since ethnic minority parents can overreact and invest more eﬀort in transmitting
their identity, which ultimately leads to less integration. Our third contribution is the
modelling of the behavior of the majority group (i.e. racism and harassment), which can
negatively react to oppositional identity behaviors. As it turns out, racism and integration
have natural complementarities that may give rise to social multiplier eﬀects and/or multiple
social steady state equilibria. This has also important policy implications because it indicates
that an optimal integration policy should also take into account the reaction of the majority
group.
3 The model
Suppose that the population is of ﬁxed size N and composed of a majority group and
a minority group. We denote by subscript b the minority group, whose size is Nb, and
by subscript w the majority group, whose size is Nw (with Nb + Nw = N), to which some
individuals from the minority group might want to assimilate, i.e. share the same preferences
and values. The two groups can be diﬀerentiated by some external attribute, such as the skin
9color, hair, size, etc., which is exogenous to the individual. On the other hand, preferences,
values and identity are not exogenous and are aﬀected by individuals’ decisions. Let us
denote by qb = Nb/(Nb +Nw) and qw = 1 −qb, the fraction of individuals from the minority
and majority groups in the population. By deﬁnition qb < 1/2.
We consider the formation of cultural traits through a mechanism that interacts (i)
cultural transmission and socialization inside the family, (ii) social interactions and peer
eﬀects, via imitation and learning, and (iii) identity choice.
To begin with, we focus only on cultural transmission and identity choices of the minority
group b (with parents eventually spending eﬀort to transmit their values and preferences).
Within this minority group, there are two potential types of individuals: those who adopt
the mainstream values and want to assimilate to the majority group, and those who reject
the mainstream social norms. In other words, some individuals in the minority group may
“choose” to adopt “oppositional” identities so that some individuals of that group may
identify with the dominant culture and others may reject that culture. We refer to the ﬁrst
group as being “mainstream” (type i = m) and the other as being “oppositional” (type
i = o).
All individuals from the majority group are assumed to be mainstream while minori-
ties can be either mainstream or oppositional. We model the formation of assimilation or
“oppositional” culture as follows.
(i) Families are composed of one parent and a child (both without speciﬁed gender). All
children are born without deﬁned preferences or cultural traits, and are ﬁrst exposed to their
parent’s trait. Cultural transmission inside the family to the parent’s trait i = m,o, occurs
with a probability that is the result of costly socialization eﬀort on the part of the parent
(see Bisin and Verdier, 2000, 2001).
(ii) If a child from a family with trait i = m,o is not directly socialized, he interacts with
peers, role models, and other cultural parents within his neighborhood where he is raised. As
a consequence of such social interactions, the child adopts a cultural trait with a probability
that depends on the cultural composition of his neighborhood.
(iii) After being socialized to a particular trait (directly or indirectly), the intensity
with which an individual identiﬁes to that trait (i.e. his cultural identity) is nonetheless
his personal choice, that is, it is not transmitted by the family. Building on Akerlof and
Kranton (2000), we emphasize here the idea that identity formation is strongly related to
the identiﬁcation to others on prescriptions on what “should” or “ought” to be done. From
this, it follows that interacting with individuals that do not share these prescriptions and
values generate psychological costs, as it creates some cognitive dissonance between oneself
10and the others. Choosing the intensity of an identity can then be conceptualized as a
psychological defense to reduce these costs. By choosing a stronger identity, an individual
tends to reaﬃrm the perception/feeling of his own preferences and values structure even
when confronted with someone who does not share these values. Doing so is not immediate
and may require psychological resources and eﬀorts.
3.1 Preferences
Each individual has to decide between two possible actions G (“good”) and B (“bad”).
Action G is what is “good” in terms of mainstream values while action B is what is rejected
by the majority group but can, of course, be “good” for the minority group. For example,
one could have: G ={Wearing the Islamic veil} and B ={Not wearing the Islamic veil} or
G ={Wearing western clothes} and B ={Wearing ethnic clothes}.
We deﬁne preferences such that a mainstream minority individual always prefers G to B
while the oppositional person always prefers B to G. In particular, we assume that individual
preferences of each type (i = m,o) have a utility component deﬁned on actions {G,B} and
characterized in the following way.
(i) A mainstream minority individual (type m) with intensity of identity αm ∈ [0,1] has
a utility component on actions {G,B} given by:
um(G,αm) = U and um(B,αm) = −Ψ(αm) (1)
where U > 0 reﬂects the economic returns of action G while action B generates a lower
return, normalized to 0 for simplicity. There is also a cost Ψ(αm) > 0 of choosing action
B, which depends on αm ∈ [0,1], a measure of the intensity of identity. It is assumed that
Ψ′(αm) > 0 and Ψ′′(αm) ≥ 0, namely the stronger the identity associated to this “socially
established” preference, the larger, and at an increasing rate, is the perceived “disutility”
of action B. Since um(G,αm) > um(B,αm), ∀αm ∈ [0,1], action G is always chosen by a
mainstream minority individual.
(ii) An “oppositional” minority individual with identity intensity αo, has an instanta-
neous utility on actions {G,B} given by:
uo(G,αo) = U − Φ(αo) and uo(B,αo) = 0 (2)
where Φ(αo) is a disutility cost of action G in that system of values and αo ∈ [0,1] is
the intensity of identity associated with that system of “oppositional” values. Again we
assume that Φ′(αo) > 0, Φ′′(αo) ≥ 0, namely the stronger the identity associated to the
11“oppositional” preference, the larger, and at an increasing rate, the perceived “disutility”
for undertaking action G. We will also make the following (simplifying) assumption that
U < Φ(0) so that uo(G) < uo(B), ∀αo ∈ [0,1], and thus action B is always chosen by an
oppositional minority. Here, individuals are “oppositional” in the sense that they value more
action B, which is the action “not promoted” by the majority group value system.
Now, each individual i = m,o not only decides which action x = G,B to take, but
also the intensity of his identity αi. More precisely, an individual of type i = m,o has the
following instantaneous preferences:
Wi(x,αi) = ui(x,αi) − λ(αi)QiIi − C(αi) for x = G,B (3)
where ui(x,αi) is the utility component deﬁned on actions x = G,B, as described by (1) for
i = m and by (2) for i = o. In (3), there are two additional components. The term λ(αi)QiIi
reﬂects the “social” utility loss for individual i of interacting with individuals j  = i. In
this expression, Ii and Qi, are respectively the psychological cost and the probability for an
individual of type i = m,o of interacting with an individual of type j = m,o, j  = i7 while
λ(αi) is the unit cost for individual i of not identifying to the value system j  = i. Hence
λ(αi)QiIi represents the expected psychological costs for individual i of interacting with
individual j  = i. As stated in the Introduction, this is quite diﬀerent from the conformist
model since the psychological cost arises from interactions with others of a diﬀerent type,
regardless of whether they are from the same ethnic group or not. For example, a very
assimilated African American in the United States will have a psychologic cost of interacting
with an African American having a strong “black” identity because they have diﬀerent values.
The former may like to study and have good grades and thus may suﬀer to interact with the
latter, who may accuse him of “acting white” and reject his behavior.
The unit cost λ(αi) is, quite naturally, assumed to be decreasing with the intensity of
identity, i.e. λ
′(αi) < 0 (we also assume λ
′′(αi) ≥ 0 to get a well deﬁned concave problem,
and λ(0) = +∞ to get interior solutions for identity intensity). Let us give the intuition of
why λ
′(αi) < 0. The idea is that each minority individual i = m,o has a psychological cost
of interacting with another minority individual j = m,o, j  = i, with whom he is randomly
matched. However, a stronger identiﬁcation with his own culture (i.e. higher αi) is a way of
reducing this cost. Indeed, the more an individual is, for example, “oppositional”, the more
he is “pride” of his own ethnic identity, and the less he feels threatened by another minority
individual who promotes mainstream (white) values.
Finally in (3), the term C(αi) captures the fact that identity formation is costly in
7Qi is determined below.
12itself. Hence higher values of αi are formed at a psychological cost C(αi), with C′(αi) > 0,
C′′(αi) ≥ 0, C(0) = 0.
It is important here to diﬀerentiate how αi aﬀects the utility function ui(x,αi) and how
it aﬀects the psychological cost λ(αi). Take again an oppositional individual i = o. For the
former, a high αo penalizes more action G that is promoted by the mainstream culture. For
the latter, a high αo reduces the cost of interacting with a mainstream individual.
3.2 Socialization and identity choice
In a given period t, consider one of our minority group families composed of a parent of
trait i and a child. At the beginning of that period t, we assume that the adult parent i
has already been socialized to a value system i = m,o. He chooses his own identity αi as
well as his best action x. Then, he gives birth to his child who has not yet a well-deﬁned
value system. The adult parent chooses at this stage τi, the direct socialization of his child.
The child then, in turn, possibly acquires his particular trait i through an intergenerational
transmission mechanism, which depends on the parent’s socialization eﬀort, τi, and on the
social environment where the parent lives and the child is raised. Then, comes the next
period t + 1 with the child grown up as a socialized adult who faces the same sequence of
events and actions as his parent in period t.
3.2.1 The parent’s and the child’s identity choices
As already mentioned above, in each period, an adult individual of type i = m,o makes an
identity choice, which consists in choosing action x = G,B and identity intensity αi. We
formulated preferences in such a way that mainstream minority individual (type m) always
choose action G while oppositional individuals (type o) always choose action B (see (1) and




[U − λ(αm)QmIm − C(αm)] (4)
while, for an oppositional individual, it is given by:
max
αo
[−λ(αo)QoIo − C(αo)] (5)







i) = 0, i = m,o (6)
13Observe that −λ
′(αi) > 0 and −C′(αi) < 0, and since λ
′′(.) ≥ 0, C′′(.) ≥ 0, and λ(0) =
+∞, there is a unique interior solution to each of these problems. We denote this solution
by α∗
i = α(QiIi), which depends positively on the expected identity cost QiIi of socially
interacting with someone having a diﬀerent value system.
3.2.2 The parent’s socialization choice
The cultural transmission and socialization process we adopt here is similar to that of Bisin
and Verdier (2000, 2001). Parents are altruistic but in a paternalistic manner. That is,
parents care about their child’s future well-being but they evaluate it as if it were their own.
Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) refer to this form of paternalistic altruism in the context of
cultural transmission models as imperfect empathy. So, for example, when a parent i = m,o
wants to evaluate the (future) utility of his child, he considers the following utility:
Vi(xc,αi) = ui(xc,αi) − λ(αi)Q
e
cIi
where xc represents the child’s decisions8 of choosing between actions G or B, given the
child’s own environment, and Qe
c denotes the probability of interactions between two indi-
viduals with diﬀerent value systems in the child’s environment, as expected by the parent.9
Therefore, while parents perceive and evaluate altruistically the behavior of their children,
xc, through the lenses of their own identity αi, they anticipate correctly the environment of
their child (possibly diﬀerent from their own environment), his choice xc and his probability
of interactions Qe
c with individuals diﬀerent from him.10 Clearly, the child optimal choice of
action may be diﬀerent from that of the parent. As such, this will be perceived by the parent
as sub-optimal, given that the latter only evaluates his child’s action through the lenses of
his own perspective. This, in turn, will generate an incentive for the parent to socialize his
child to his own value system.
To be more precise, consider a parent of trait i = m,o. He ﬁrst decides how much eﬀort
τi he puts in direct vertical socialization. As a consequence, the child is directly socialized
to trait i with probability τi. If the child is not directly socialized (which happens with
probability 1−τi), he picks a cultural parent at random from the population of role models
8Subscript c refers to the child. When a variable has no subscript c, then it corresponds to the choice
variable of the parent.
9The superscript e refers to the parent’s expectations.
10Note also that parents do not take into account the cost C(αc
i) of identity formation of the child. This
is perfectly consistent with the fact that the parent perceives the child’s actions through the lense of his own
already formed identity intensity αi.
14in the neighborhood in which he is raised. The child thus adopts the trait i = m,o if the role
model happens to have this trait. Otherwise the child assimilates to the other value system.
Therefore, the probability that a parent of trait i has a child of trait i is given by:
Pii = τi + (1 − τi)ri (7)
where ri is the probability that the society role model is of type i.11 On the other hand, when
not successfully socialized to trait i, the probability that the child does adopt the alternative
trait j  = i is equal to:
Pij = (1 − τi)(1 − ri) (8)
Note that Pii and Pij both depend on ri, the composition of role models in the neighborhood
















cIi] − Θ(τi)} (9)
where Pii and Pij are given by (7) and (8), α∗
i = α(QiIi) by (6), and Θ(τi) is the cost of
socialization with Θ′(τi) > 0 for all τi ∈ (0,1], Θ′′(τi) ≥ 0, Θ(0) = 0. To better understand
this maximization problem, let us write it for each type of parent i = m,o. We have:
max
τm























cIo] − Θ(τo)} (11)
Indeed, each parent evaluates the utility of his child as if it was his own utility (imperfect
empathy). When the parent is of type m (mainstream; see (10)), with probability Pmm
his child adopts the same trait m and thus becomes mainstream. In that case, the child
will always choose action G (and thus gets utility um(G) = U) while he will be perceived
as getting a utility loss of social interactions λ(α∗
m)Qe
cIm as evaluated by the parent, with
identity of the child as α∗
m = α(QmIm) deﬁned by (6). When making his socialization
decision τm, the parent anticipates that the percentage of individuals with trait m living in
the neighborhood of his child is Qe
c. However, with probability Pmo, his child adopts the other
trait i = o and becomes oppositional. In that case, the parent anticipates that his child will
always choose action B. This is where the imperfect empathy assumption comes in. If the
parent was just evaluating the utility of his child, we would have had uo(B) = 0. But since
he is evaluating the utility of his child through his own utility, we have: um(B) = −Ψ(α∗
m),
11ri is determined below.
15i.e. taking action B (the child) given that the type is m (the parent). The interpretation of
the other equation (11) is exactly the same with uo(B) = 0 for Poo and uo(G) = U − Φ(α∗
o)
for Pom.




i) = (1 − ri)∆Vi (12)







∆Vm = U + Ψ(α
∗
m) = U + Ψ(α(QmIm)) > 0
∆Vo = Φ(α
∗
o) − U = Φ(α(QoIo)) − U > 0
∆Vi captures parent i’s identity since it measures how important it is for him that his child
adopts his own trait i. For example, ∆Vo corresponds to parent i’s perceived utility gains
from having a non-assimilated child. Let τ∗
i = τi (∆Vi) denote the parent’s socialization
choice, the solution of socialization problem (9).
To close the model, we need to determine Qi, the probability of interacting (in the parents’
generation period) with somebody with the other value system, and ri, the frequency of role
models of type i to whom a child of the minority group is exposed. Let pb (resp. pw) be the
probability for an individual from the minority group of being matched with someone from
the minority group (resp. the majority group). It is respectively given by:
pb = qb + (1 − s)qw (14)
= 1 − s(1 − qb)
and
pw = sqw (15)
where qb = Nb/(Nb + Nw) and qw = 1 − qb denote respectively the fraction of minority and
majority individuals in the population, while s ∈ [0,1] is an inverse measure of the degree
of social segmentation or segregation between the minority and the majority groups. When
s = 0, there is full segmentation/segregation and thus pb = qb + qw and pw = 0. The case
s = 1 corresponds to a random matching since pb = qb and pw = qw. Therefore, the lower
is s, the more the society is segregated and it is less likely for the diﬀerent communities
to interact with each other (
∂pb
∂s < 0 and
∂pw
∂s > 0). Assuming that, within the minority
16group, matching is random, we immediately obtain the probabilities Qi of interacting with
individuals j  = i as:
Qm = pb(1 − qm) = [qb + (1 − s)qw](1 − qm)
Qo = pbqm + pw = [qb + (1 − s)qw]qm + sqw
where qm = Nm/Nb and 1−qm are respectively the fractions of mainstream and oppositional
individuals in the minority group, and where Nm is the number of mainstream minority indi-
viduals. Since a person from the majority group cannot be oppositional, the probability Qm
that a mainstream minority individual meets an oppositional individual is simply pb(1−qm),
i.e. the probability of meeting an oppositional individual within the minority community.
However, Qo, the probability that an oppositional individual meets a mainstream individual
is the sum of two probabilities, namely pbqm, the probability to be matched with a main-
stream individual from the minority community plus pw the probability of being matched
with a majority individual (who by deﬁnition is a mainstream person). Since qb + qw = 1,
we have:
Qm = (1 − s + sqb)(1 − qm) (16)

















Qm(qm,s,qb) + Qo(qm,s,qb) = 1
We now need to determine ri, the probability for a child to being exposed to a role model
of type i. The frequency of role models of type m to which a child from the minority group
is exposed to depends on the technology of information, the socialization of the society, and
the community at large (schools, churches, clubs, gangs, etc...). If we assume that there is
also a degree of segmentation d ∈ [0,1] in cultural exposure along the minority-majority lines
(possibly diﬀerent from s), one may then write the following probabilities as:
rm = [qb + (1 − d)qw]qm + dqw = (1 − d + dqb)qm + d(1 − qb) (20)
ro = [qb + (1 − d)qw](1 − qm) = (1 − d + dqb)(1 − qm) (21)
17Indeed, the probability rm for a child of meeting a mainstream role model is, once more, the
sum of two probabilities, namely the probabilities of meeting a mainstream role model among
the minority and majority groups. For ro, since only ethnic minorities can be oppositional,
it is simply the probability of meeting an oppositional role model among the minority group.
Observe that when d = 0, there is full segmentation since rm = qm and ro = 1 −qm whereas
the case d = 1 corresponds to a random matching since rm = 1 − ro and ro = qb (1 − qm).
Therefore , the higher is d, the less the society is culturally segmented between the majority
and the minority groups and it is more likely for ethnic minorities to meet mainstream role
models (∂rm
∂d > 0 and ∂ro















Namely, ro, the probability to be exposed to an oppositional role model is an increasing
function of the degree of segmentation (low value of d), the fraction of the minority group
(high value of qb), and the fraction of oppositional individuals in the minority group (high
value of 1 − qm). For rm = 1 − ro, we have, of course, the opposite result.
We are now able to write the socialization eﬀort decision τi of parents as a function of




i) = [1 − ri (qm,d,qb)]∆Vi (U,Qi(qm,s,qb)Ii) (24)



























The cultural transmission eﬀort τm of the mainstream minority family is a decreasing func-
tion of the fraction of mainstream individuals, whether inside the minority group (fraction
qm) or the majority group (fraction qw = 1−qb). We have the opposite result for oppositional
parents. This reﬂects cultural substituability between family and external role models in so-
cializing children to a particular cultural trait. Indeed, the more common is a trait i = m,o
in the society, the lower is the parents’ eﬀort in socializing that trait. Moreover, the cultural
transmission eﬀort τm of mainstream minority parents is increasing with segregation (low
values of s). Indeed, when segregation between the majority and the minority groups is very
18severe, i.e. the two groups do not interact very much with each other, the mainstream mi-
nority parent tends to mostly interact with oppositional minority parents and has therefore
higher incentives to develop a strong mainstream identity αm. This, in turn, increases his
marginal incentives to have his child adopting his own preference pattern (i.e. ∆V m) and
therefore his socialization eﬀort τm is larger. Finally the larger the degree of cultural seg-
mentation (low values of d), i.e. the less likely for ethnic minorities to meet mainstream role
models, the larger the socialization eﬀort of the mainstream minority individual. Again, this
reﬂects the cultural substituability eﬀect. High cultural segmentation means that children of
mainstream minority families have more chance to be exposed to oppositional role models.
This, in turn, induces mainstream minority families to spend more eﬀort to “preserve” their
children from such cultural inﬂuence. Similar intuition can be developed to understand the
eﬀects of qm,qb,s, and d on the cultural transmission eﬀort τ∗
o of oppositional families.
4 Cultural equilibrium and its properties
4.1 Steady-state equilibrium
The dynamics of cultural evolution from period t to period t+1 is described by the following
equation :
qm,t+1 = qm,tPmm + (1 − qm,t)Pom
= qm,t [τ
∗
mt + (1 − τ
∗




it = τi(qm,t) is deﬁned by (24) and rmt = rm(qm,t) by (20). The interpretation
of this equation is straightforward. The proportion of mainstream minority individuals
qm,t+1 at time t + 1 is equal to all new-born minority children who become mainstream and
whose parents were mainstream (qm,tPmm) plus all new-born minority children who become
mainstream but whose parents were oppositional ((1 − qm,t)Pom).
This equation is equivalent to:
qm,t+1 − qm,t = (1 − qm,t)(1 − τ
∗
ot)rmt − (1 − τ
∗
mt)qm,t (1 − rmt)
Now, by substituting the values of rm and 1−rm from (20) in this equation, we easily obtain:




ot) + (1 − τ
∗
ot)d(1 − qb)}
In steady-state, qm,t+1 = qm,t = q∗









o) + (1 − τ
∗
o)d(1 − qb)} = 0
There is a ﬁrst obvious steady-state equilibrium at q∗
m = 1, which implies that all minority
individuals fully assimilate to the mainstream values. There can also be an interior steady-









o) + (1 − τ
∗
o)d(1 − qb) = 0 (27)
The following proposition characterizes the nature of the long-run cultural steady-state
equilibrium:12
Proposition 1 (Existence and uniqueness of an interior equilibrium) There exists a
unique interior steady-state equilibrium q∗
m ∈ ]0,1[ deﬁned by (27) if and only if:
Θ
′(d(1 − qb)) < Φ(αo(Io)) − U (28)
In such a steady-state, the oppositional minority families exert more cultural transmission
eﬀort than the mainstream minority families, i.e. τ∗
m ≤ τ∗
o.
Proposition 1 essentially says that an oppositional culture in the minority group can be
sustained if and only if there is enough cultural segmentation in terms of role models (i.e. d
small enough), and/or the size of minority group is large enough (i.e. qb large enough), and/or
the degree of oppositional identity it implies is high enough (i.e. Φ(.) and Io high enough),
and/or the socio-economic opportunity cost of the actions it prescribes is small enough (i.e.
U small enough). Note that there is clearly an asymmetry between the two cultural traits
m and o because of the “imposed” process of exposition to role models from the dominant
majority group. This tends quite naturally to favor the diﬀusion of the mainstream values
into the minority community. Given that, in order to have a long run constant fraction of
oppositional individuals, it has to be that their family socialization eﬀort compensates for
this asymmetric cultural bias. This is why their socialization eﬀort τ∗
o is larger than that
of the mainstream minority families, τ∗
m. When the “imposed” socialization through the
majority cultural model is strong enough, then there is no way for the oppositional culture
to survive and there is therefore full assimilation, i.e. q∗
m = 1.
12The proofs of all propositions can be found in the Appendix.
204.2 Full cultural segmentation equilibrium
An interesting special case to investigate is the situation when there is full cultural segmen-
tation (i.e. d = 0). In such a case, cultural transmission occurs only through the exposure
to role models inside the minority community. The dynamic equation of evolution of the
oppositional trait now follows the following equation:





which has the familiar form of a replicator dynamics, except for the fact that the “ﬁtness”
values are explicitly derived from a process of cultural socialization and thus reﬂect the
socialization eﬀorts τ∗
m and τ∗
o of the families. In that case, as there is no “imposed” social-
ization stemming from the exposition to majority role models, and the long-run fraction of






Since d = 0, then, by using (20) and (21), we have that: 1 − rm = 1 − qm and 1 − ro = qm.









Simple inspection shows that this equation has a unique interior solution described in Figure
1. It is indeed easy to see that the RHS of (30) is a decreasing function of qm while the LHS
of (30) is an increasing function of qm, and that the two curves only cross once at q∗
m.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
4.3 Comparative statics
Let us now consider the general case, d > 0, and analyze the properties of the interior
equilibrium described in Proposition 1. We thus assume that (28) holds.
4.3.1 Prevalence of an oppositional culture
In the case of an interior solution with an oppositional culture, the model provides interesting
comparative statics results on various variables of the environment of the minority group.
21Proposition 2 (Prevalence of an oppositional culture)
(i) An increase in the opportunity cost U reduces the prevalence of an oppositional culture;
(ii) A reduction of segregation (i.e. an increase in s) increases the prevalence of an oppo-
sitional culture;
(iii) An increase in the size of the minority group qb has an ambiguous eﬀect on the preva-
lence of an oppositional culture;
(iv) A reduction of cultural segmentation (i.e. an increase in d) has an ambiguous eﬀect
on the prevalence of an oppositional culture.
Indeed, increasing the opportunity cost U of the action prescribed by the oppositional
culture (i.e. action B) tends to increase the marginal socializing incentives ∆Vm of the
mainstream families while it decreases the marginal socializing incentives ∆Vo of the oppo-
sitional families. This, in turn, increases the transmission eﬀort τ∗
m of mainstream parents
and decrease that of oppositional parents, τ∗
o. As a result, this leads to a lower prevalence
of oppositional preferences within the minority group.
Similarly, a reduction in segregation tends to intensify oppositional identities (i.e. in-
creases αo) while it reduces the identity intensity of mainstream minorities (i.e. reduces
αm). This, in turn, tends to increase the marginal socializing incentives ∆Vo of the opposi-
tional families while it decreases that of mainstream families, ∆Vm. The resulting increase
in τ∗
o and decrease in τ∗
m lead to a rise in the prevalence of oppositional types in the minority
group.
It is interesting to scrutinize the ambiguity results of qb and d on q∗
m. There are in fact
two opposite eﬀects: a socialization level eﬀect and a marginal socialization eﬀect. Take for
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(31)
A larger size of the minority group qb tends to increase the likelihood for children to be
exposed to oppositional role models as they only exist in the minority community. This, in
turn, promotes cultural transmission towards the oppositional trait o. This is reﬂected in (31)
22by the ﬁrst two negative expressions.13 At the same time, a larger minority population makes
it more likely for minority individuals to socially interact. This increases the probability
Qm for a mainstream minority of matching with an oppositional individual while, on the
opposite, it tends to reduce the probability Qo for an oppositional person of matching with a
mainstream individual since there are no oppositional individuals in the majority group. This
leads to an increase in identity intensity αm from the mainstream minorities and a decrease
in identity intensity αo from the oppositional minorities. This leads to a larger prevalence of
the cultural transmission eﬀort from the mainstream minorities and a reduction in cultural
transmission eﬀort from the oppositional minorities. This marginal eﬀect of socialization
will favor the prevalence of the mainstream trait inside the minority community. This eﬀect
is illustrated by the last positive term in (31).
Again, a particular interesting case in which this ambiguity can be solved is when there is
full cultural segmentation (i.e. d = 0). In that case, there is no socialization level eﬀect since
minority children are not exposed at all to the majority role models and only the positive
marginal socialization eﬀect remains. Thus, we have:
Corollary 1 When there is perfect cultural segmentation (i.e. d = 0), an increase in the




Similarly, as we have seen in Proposition 2, a change in cultural segmentation d has an
ambiguous eﬀect on q∗
m because of the opposite eﬀects of the socialization level and marginal
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(32)
Indeed, a reduction in cultural segmentation tends to increase the “imposed” cultural in-
ﬂuence of the majority group. This promotes the diﬀusion of mainstream values inside the
minority group. This is the socialization level eﬀect and it is reﬂected by the two ﬁrst
positive terms in equation (32). On the other hand, there is also a negative marginal social-
ization eﬀect which is related to the way diﬀerent families react to the increased exposure
to role models of the majority group. Indeed, because family and social models are cultural
substitutes, an increased exposure to models of the majority group will reduce the family
13Remember that, in equilibrium, τ∗
m ≤ τ∗
o.
23socialization eﬀort of mainstream minority families but will increase that of oppositional
families. This marginal eﬀect per se tends to favor the diﬀusion of oppositional views inside
the minority group. This is described by the last negative term in (32).
It is interesting to consider once more the full cultural segregation case when d = 0. We
have the following result:
Corollary 2 When socialization costs of families are convex enough, a reduction of cul-
tural segmentation at the full cultural segmentation equilibrium reduces the prevalence of the
oppositional culture.
4.3.2 Intensity of identity
The model also provides some comparative statics on identity intensities within the minority















































There are two eﬀects: a short-run eﬀect, evaluated for a given fraction of oppositional in-
dividuals 1 − qm in the minority group, and a long-run eﬀect, taking into account the full
dynamic implications on the evolution of the oppositional trait in the group. The short-run




∂v , comes from the impact of a change in one parameter on
the probability Qi of matching a diﬀerent cultural type in the population. This has immedi-
ate eﬀects on the intensity of identity since individuals tend to vary their identity strength
in order to change their psychological cost of such matching on their utility. The long run






dv , stems from the fact that a change in a parameter v
may aﬀect as well the long-run frequency of oppositional types in the minority population.
This, in turn, has long run implications on the probability of social interactions with individ-
uals who share diﬀerent values. In particular, if the frequency of oppositional types increases
in the long run (i.e. q∗
m decreases), then this triggers a reaction of intensity of identity of
mainstream minority individuals while, on the contrary, it reduces the identity intensity for
oppositional families. More speciﬁcally:
24Corollary 3 An increase in the opportunity cost U of the oppositional culture has no eﬀect
in the short run while, in the long run, it tends to reduce the identity intensity of mainstream
individuals and increase it for oppositional individuals in the minority group.
Intuitively, as there are less oppositional persons in the minority community, people tend
to match more often with individuals who do not share their views. This, in turn, tends to
make them more conﬁdent about their own identity. The opposite occurs for mainstream
minority individuals.
Consider now a change in s, the segregation parameter. A reduction in segregation has
now a short run and a long run eﬀects. The short run impact comes from the fact that an
increase in s increases Qo and reduces Qm. This tends to increase the identity intensity αo
of oppositional individuals and reduce the identity intensity αm of mainstream people. At
the same time, however, a reduction in segregation increases the prevalence of oppositional
families in the minority group as it stimulates their cultural transmission eﬀorts relative to
mainstream parents. This increased prevalence of oppositional types leads, in turn, to a
decrease of the oppositional identity intensity and to an increase of the mainstream identity.
It follows therefore that the long run eﬀect goes in opposite direction to the short-run impact.
In general, the full eﬀect of a change in segregation on identity intensity is ambiguous. Again
however for situations close to full cultural segmentation (i.e. d = 0), one can resolve this
ambiguity. We have:
Corollary 4 Assume d = 0. Then, a reduction in segregation (i.e. an increase in s) leads
to a positive impact on oppositional identity and a negative impact on mainstream identity.
The long run eﬀect is smaller than the short run impact.
5 Justiﬁcation of assumptions and modelling choices
Our model, like most models, is based of assumptions and modeling choices. It is relatively
complex since we model three main aspects: (i) the parental investment in transmitting
his own trait, (ii) the role of peers and neighborhood when this transmission fails, (iii) the
choice of intensity of identity of children.
One could have, for example, developed a simpler model with no parental investment.
Let us now argue what we believe that this last aspect is crucial for the result.
First, if there were no parental investment then the dynamics of qm will be trivial (see
(27)) since they will be no interior equilibrium. The richness of our model is the fact that
both τ∗
m and τ∗
o are choice variables and depend on qm, qb, s, d, and U.
25Second, how important is parental investment in transmitting ethnic identity in the real
world? Observe that we are not looking at the transmission of a trait for which everybody
agrees on the fact that it is good or bad (like, for example, education or crime). In that
case, no parent will put eﬀort (which is costly) in transmitting “bad” education or criminal
behavior. This is not what we are modelling here. We are looking at ethnic identity issues and
how ethnic identity is transmitted from one generation to another. Identity is horizontally
diﬀerentiated (i.e. it is a matter of taste which trait one wants to transmit) while crime or
bad behavior is vertically diﬀerentiated (i.e. all parents agree that crime is not good and thus
put no eﬀort in transmitting this trait). In that respect, we believe that the assumption of
imperfect empathy (or paternalistic altruism) makes sense in this framework.14 All parents,
especially those with a strong ethnic identity, are biased in their evaluation of the well-
being of their oﬀsprings. Otherwise, how can we understand that some parents prefer their
daughter not to go to school rather than not wearing the Islamic veil (there were a famous
case in England some years ago). Also, why parents in some communities are actively putting
eﬀort for arranged marriages for their kids if not for keeping a strong identity. Arranged
marriage is still common in South America, India, Pakistan, Japan, Iran, etc. Among most
Indian and Nepalese Hindus, the hereditary system of caste is an extremely important factor
in arranged marriage. Arranged marriages, and parents, almost always require that the
married persons should be of the same caste. Couples who defy arranged marriages in
certain (especially rural) places, are sometimes separated, ostracized, or even killed. In that
case, parents clearly evaluate the well-being of their children as if it was their own utility.
So what about the evidence on parental transmission of ethnic identity. In the psychol-
ogy/sociology literature, the family is considered the primary socializing agent of the group
because it is the ﬁrst institution with which an individual comes into contact, and often the
last institution with which the individual has ﬁnal ties (Johnson, 1981). In comparison to
other inﬂuences, family socialization has been said to have the most inﬂuential and lasting
impact on the child’s competencies as a functioning human being (Harrison et al, 1990). One
aspect of family socialization, ethnic socialization, entails preparing the child for diﬀerent
environmental niches by giving the child a positive sense of ethnic identity (Boykin, 1986;
Johnson, 1981). The family, by inculcating a positive sense of ethnic identity (Hughes and
Demo, 1989) serves as a buﬀer from the impact of the child’s minority status (Jackson et
al., 1981).
One of the ﬁrst empirical examinations of ethnic socialization among African American
parents was conducted by Marie Ferguson Peters. Peters (1985), in her Toddler Infant Expe-
14See Bisin and Verdier (2000) page 962 for evidence on the “imperfect empathy” assumption.
26riences Study (TIES), examined African American parents’ socialization of their preschoolers.
The global ﬁndings from her empirical, descriptive study suggest that the African American
mothers were gravely concerned about their children growing up in an environment that
was generally not safe for them because of their ethnicity. Additionally, the parents tended
to emphasize the following in their socialization practices: (1) self-esteem, (2) positive feel-
ings about their ethnicity, (3) self-respect, (4) lack of fair and honest treatment from White
Americans, and (5) education.
Another study that addresses this issue is that conducted by Demo and Hughes (1990).
In their study, utilizing the National Survey of Black Americans data set, these researchers
examined the relationship of racial identity to ethnic socialization. In distinguishing between
the diﬀerent types of socialization strategies employed by parents, the authors report that
parents who took an assertive/integrative style to socializing their children had children
who felt a greater attachment to their ethnic group. An assertive/integrative style is one in
which the parent instructed the child on the general importance of their black heritage, the
equality of all people, and the importance of getting along with white people. Thus, racial
group identity as measured through the individual’s feeling of closeness to other blacks was
impacted by the parent’s emphasis on preparing the child for a race-conscious milieu.
Spencer (1983) investigated the relationship between the socialization practices of black
parents and their children’s feelings and preferences about black culture. Spencer found
that parents who talk to their children about the civil rights movement, black history, and
discrimination had children who expressed a more positive attitude about black culture than
did the children of parents who did not discuss these issues.
Focussing on the Hispanic ethnic-identity transmission, Knight et al. (1993) show that
parents communicate ethnic content to their children through such means as child-rearing
practices, teaching, media. Mothers who taught about the Mexican culture, pride and dis-
crimination had children who engaged in more ethnic behaviors, who used more Mexican
behaviors and expressed more ethnic preferences. They conclude that mothers who teach
and model their children about the Mexican culture have eﬀects on their children ethnic
identity.
Investigating the transmission of Jewish ethnic identity, Davey et al. (2003) ﬁnd that
clear expectations, a type of authoritative parenting, could style be associated with the
positive transmission of Jewish ethnic identity. This type of parenting style was direct as
parents expressed clear expectations for participation in Jewish activities both at home and
in the community.
All this evidence points out to the fact that parental investment in transmitting ethnic
27identity is crucial to understand the emergence of ethnic identity among their children.
6 Harassment from the dominant group
6.1 Unconditional harassment
We would like now to extend the previous model to analyze the impact of racial harassment
on the existence and evolution of a oppositional minority culture. Let us assume that, in the
majority group, there are some individuals who are negatively aﬀected when matched with a
minority individual (it does not matter if this minority person is mainstream or oppositional).
Because they feel a loss of identity Iγ when matched with a minority person, they are ready
to take an harassment action Z in order to recover part of their identity loss (i.e. reduce
the identity cost). We refer to these individuals as racists and we denote by γ the fraction
of racist individuals in the majority group. We assume that the racist individuals have to
pay a cost cZ for the harassment action Z, which consequently reduces their identity cost to
Iγ = Iγ(Z) with I′
γ(Z) < 0 and I′′
γ(Z) ≥ 0. After matching with a minority individual, the









which deﬁnes an optimal harassment level Z∗ = Z(c), with Z′(c) ≤ 0 since higher costs
reduces the level of harassment chosen.
We assume that the harassment Z against a minority individual has two eﬀects. First, it
negatively aﬀects the expected economic payoﬀ of action G for an ethnic minority. Second, it
increases the psychological cost Io for a oppositional person of interacting with a mainstream
individual from the majority group. Therefore, U, the economic returns of action G, is now a
function of Z, i.e. U = U(Z), with U′(Z) < 0 and U′′(Z) ≤ 0, and Io, the psychological cost
for an oppositional individual of interacting with a mainstream individual, is also a function
of Z, i.e. Io = Io(Z) with I′
o(Z) > 0 and I′′
o(Z) ≥ 0. As a result, contrary to (1) and (2), the
economic returns of action G now depends with whom the minority individual is matched.
As a result, the expected payoﬀ of undertaking action G is now given by:
EU(Z,γ) = s(1 − qb)γ U(Z) + [1 − s(1 − qb)γ]U(0) (33)
28Indeed, with probability s(1 − qb)γ, a minority individual is matched with a racist majority
individual and therefore suﬀers the socio-economic cost of harassment, i.e. U(Z). With the
residual probability, he is not matched to a racist person and enjoys a full payoﬀ U(0) = U.15
We are now able to solve the choice of identity intensity. Let us start with a mainstream
minority individual. He will solve the following program:
max
αm
[EU(Z,γ) − λ(αm)QmIm − C(αm)]
Observe that, when choosing optimally αm, this mainstream person will not be aﬀected by
harassment Z because EU(Z,γ) does not depend on αm and there is an expected psycho-
logical cost only if one interacts with someone with a diﬀerent trait. Since here the person is
mainstream, the only cost Im borne is when he interacts with an oppositional person. Since
by deﬁnition there is no oppositional individuals within the majority group, the mainstream
minority individual will not suﬀer any identity cost associated to harassment. So basically,
when a mainstream minority meets a racist from the majority group, he suﬀers a socio-
economic loss, which is increasing with the level of harassment Z (as U(Z) is decreasing
with Z). He bears, however, no psychological costs since, in terms of identity, his values are
similar to that of a mainstream (even racist) individual. As a result, the solution of this
program is still given by (6) and α∗
m is not a function of Z or γ.
On the contrary, for an oppositional individual, the program to be solved is not anymore
given by (5) but by:
max
αo
[−λ(αo){s(1 − qb)γIo(Z) + [(1 − s + sqb)qm + s(1 − qb)(1 − γ)]Io} − C(αo)]
Indeed, when someone is oppositional there is a cost of choosing action B. If this person
meets a racist (which occurs with probability s(1−qb)γ), the cost is Io(Z). If this oppositional
individual does not meet a racist majority individual, he can either meet a minority worker
(this occurs with probability (1 − s + sqb)qm) or a majority individual who is not racist (this
occurs with probability s(1− qb)(1 −γ)) and obtain in both cases a ﬁxed cost of Io(0) ≡ Io.
As a result, the term inside the curly bracket is simply the expected loss of identity of such
an oppositional individual.
The optimal level of identity intensity for an oppositional individual is then given by the







o){s(1 − qb)γIo(Z) + [(1 − s + sqb)qm + s(1 − qb)(1 − γ)]Io} (34)
15We assume that EU(Z,γ) > 0, ∀γ ∈ [0,1] so that mainstream minority individuals always choose action
B as their optimal action.
29reﬂecting the fact that this individual only suﬀers a higher identity loss when he interacts
with a majority individual that harasses him. We denote the solution of this equation by
α∗
o(Z,γ). We can now calculate the marginal incentives of cultural transmission for parents
of the two types m and o. They are given by:






where ∆Vm(Z,γ) is decreasing in both Z and γ while ∆Vo(Z,γ) is increasing in both Z
and γ. It follows that the cultural transmission eﬀort τ∗
m(qm,Z,γ) of a mainstream minority
parent is shifted downward by Z and γ. Conversely, the oppositional cultural transmission
eﬀort τ∗
o(qm,Z,γ) is shifted upward by Z and γ. As a result, the interior steady-state of
cultural dynamics is the solution of the following equation:




o(qm,Z,γ)] + [1 − τ
∗
o(qm,Z,γ)]d(1 − qb) = 0
This occurs once again when:
Ψ
′(d(1 − qb)) < Φ(α
∗
o(Z,γ)) − EU(Z,γ) (35)
Note that it is now the right-hand side of this inequality that is increasing in Z and γ and
we have therefore this straightforward result:
Proposition 3 (Oppositional culture and unconditional harassment) An oppositional
minority culture is more likely to emerge the higher the level of harassment Z and the higher
the number of racist individuals in the society.
As already mentioned in Proposition 2, an increase in social integration (i.e. an increase in
s) increases the likelihood of the emergence/persistence of an oppositional minority culture.
It should be noted as well that social integration and harassment by members of the majority
group tend to be complementary in stimulating the emergence of an oppositional minority
culture. As a matter of fact, under mild technical conditions, it can be shown that the
right-hand side Ψ = Φ(α∗
o(Z,γ)) − EU(Z,γ) of inequality (35) is increasing in Z and γ, at
an increasing rate in s (i.e. formally ∂2Ψ
∂s∂Z > 0 and ∂2Ψ
∂s∂γ > 0).16 Therefore, the following
conclusion can be drawn:
16Indeed, it is easy to see through diﬀerentation of (33) that ∂2EU
∂s∂γ < 0 and ∂2EU
∂s∂Z < 0. Also when Φ(α)
is suﬃciently log convex (i.e. Φ′′
Φ′ > Σ′′
Σ′ where Σ(α) =
C′(α)
−λ(α)), using as well (34), it can also be shown that
∂2Φ(α∗
o)
∂s∂γ > 0 and
∂2Φ(α∗
o)
∂s∂Z > 0. From this, one will get ∂2Ψ
∂s∂Z > 0 and ∂2Ψ
∂s∂γ > 0.
30Corollary 5 An increased level of harassment and a higher number of racist individuals
in the majority group is more likely to promote the emergence of an oppositional minority
culture, the less socially segmented is the minority group.
The intuition is quite simple. More social interactions with the majority group induces
more chance to suﬀer harassment and racism from that group. This reduces the economic
return to adopt the mainstream culture as well as it reinforces the identity of being an
oppositional type. The two channels favor the existence of an oppositional minority culture.
6.2 Conditional harassment
Assume now that harassment by the majority group is conditional on non-integration or
opposition to the dominant culture from ethnic minorities. More precisely, consider the
case where the racists feel an identity loss only against a minority individual if the latter is
oppositional. In other words, this is not as before pure racism against the minority group
but rather a form of conditional racism, based on fear and resentment of facing minority
individuals not conforming to mainstream values. Assume as well that the oppositional
type is not directly observable by a majority individual when socially interacting with that




{−(1 − qm)Iγ(Z) − cZ}
in which he minimizes his expected loss of identity when matched with a minority individual.
This program gives a solution Z(qm,c), which is decreasing in qm, with Z(1,c) = 0. The
level of harassment is now frequency dependent and increasing in the proportion 1 − qm
of oppositional individuals. The oppositional individuals are imposing therefore a negative
externality on the mainstream minority individuals.
An interior cultural steady state equilibrium is now the solution of :




o(qm,Z,γ)] + [1 − τ
∗
o(qm,Z,γ)]d(1 − qb) = 0
17An alternative less extreme assumption would be that the oppositional type can be partially inferred
from external signals (like clothes, physical appearance, manners, etc...). As long as the signal provides an
ex-post probability of having an oppositional type that is increasing in the fraction 1 − qm of oppositional
individuals within the minority group, the results will be qualitatively the same.
31with Z = Z(qm,c). Solving this equation gives q∗
m = qm(Z,γ), which we know to be decreas-
ing in Z and γ. Therefore, we need to solve:
q
∗
m = qm(Z,γ) and Z
∗ = Z(qm,c)
Again, there is at least one steady state as illustrated in Figures 2a and 2b.
[Insert Figures 2a and 2b here]
However, there might be now more than one steady-state equilibrium. Because of the ex-
ternality that oppositional individuals are exerting on harassment, a larger number of op-
positional types are creating more social harassment. In particular, action B has a lower
return, while oppositional individuals tend to become more polarized in terms of their iden-
tity intensity. Both dimensions, in turn, tend to reduce the cultural success of mainstream
preferences inside the minority group and to further stimulate the diﬀusion of oppositional
values over time inside that community. Harassment and oppositional culture exert on each
other complementarities that may generate multiple steady states of cultural values in the
minority group. When there is more than one equilibrium, as shown for instance in Figure
2b, one has at least one low equilibrium with little harassment and a low prevalence of op-
positional minority individuals (q∗
mL,Z∗
L) and a high equilibrium with high harassment and
a larger presence of oppositional individuals (q∗
mH,Z∗
H). At any stable steady state q∗
m and
Z∗, it is straightforward to obtain the following comparative statics results:
Proposition 4 (Oppositional culture and conditional racists) The prevalence of an
oppositional minority culture is more likely to arise the higher the number γ of “conditional”
racists in the society and the lower the cost c of the harassment. The equilibrium level
of harassment Z∗ is increasing in the number of “conditional” racists and it decreasing in
both the cost c and the level of segregation (i.e. higher s) between minority and majority
individuals.
7 Evolution of intolerance and oppositional cultures
So far, we assumed that the fraction of individuals with “racist preferences” in the majority
group was exogenous. Still, sociologists have long argued that racial prejudices and dis-
crimination in the dominant group tend to be endogenous and to increase with the size of
the subordinate group (see e.g. Blatock 1956, 1957, 1967). For instance, using data from
the Eurobarometer Survey on individual attitudes towards immigrants and racial minorities
32across 12 countries, Quillian (1995), controlling for individuals factors, shows the existence
of a positive correlation between population size of the racial minority and the degree of
racial prejudices expressed by natives of the country. This literature suggests that “racist
preferences” against minority groups are actually endogenous to the pattern of assimilation
of these minority groups. In our model, this feature could be captured by endogenizing γ, the
fraction of racist individuals. This is what is done now and we ﬁnd it useful to distinguish
between “conditional” and “unconditional” racists.
7.1 “Conditional” racists
Assume that the trait “racism” among the majority group is transmitted from one generation
to another through a mechanism that interacts cultural transmission and socialization inside
the family, and social interactions and peer eﬀects, via imitation and learning. This is the
way we modelled the transmission of the traits “oppositional” and “mainstream” in the
minority group in this paper. There are now two cultural traits in the majority group:
the trait NR “non racist”, according to which there is no identity loss when matching
with a minority individual, and the trait R “racist”, which generates identity aversion only
against oppositional minority individuals (in the previous section, we called these individuals
“conditional” racist). Individuals NR do not undertake any harassment action and thus do
not pay the harassment cost cZ. Concerning individuals R, without loss of generality, we
assume that the harassment decision is discrete {0,Z}, with an harassment cost cZ for action
Z > 0. Let us denote by ∆Iγ = Iγ(0) − Iγ(Z), the “racist” identity gain from harassing an
oppositional minority individual, with ∆Iγ > cZ. As before, the utility of a person from the
majority group is: −(1 − qm)Iγ(Z) − cZ, if he chooses to harass an oppositional minority
individual, and −(1−qm)Iγ(0), if not. As a result, when minimizing their expected identity




Z when qm ≤ 1 − cZ/∆Iγ
0 when qm > 1 − cZ/∆Iγ
When the fraction of oppositional minority individuals is large enough (i.e. qm small enough),
then majority individuals choose the harassment action Z > 0. In this context, the cultural
evolution of the fraction γ of “conditional” racists is simply given by:
γt+1 − γt = γt(1 − γt)(τR − τNR)
33where the cultural transmission eﬀorts τR and τNR of “conditional” racist and non racist
families are determined by:
Θ
′(τR) = (1 − γt)∆VR(qm,t) and Θ
′(τNR) = γt∆VNR(qm,t) (36)




(1 − qm,t)∆Iγ − cZ when qm,t ≤ 1 − cZ/∆Iγ




cZ when qm,t ≤ 1 − cZ/∆Iγ
0 when qm,t > 1 − cZ/∆Iγ
Note that ∆VR(qm,t) and ∆VNR(qm,t) diﬀer from each other only when the two preferences
R and NR induce a diﬀerent behavior with respect to minority individuals (i.e. when
qm,t ≤ 1 − cZ/∆Iγ). The full dynamic system of cultural evolution in the two variables
{qm,t,γt} can then be written as:
qm,t+1−qm,t = (1−qm,t){qm,t [τm(qm,t,Z,γt) − τo(qm,t,Z,γt)] + [1 − τo(qm,t,Z,γt)]d(1 − qb)}
γt+1 − γt = γt(1 − γt)(τR − τNR)
The interior steady states (q∗
mC,γ∗













It is convenient to restrict the discussion to the case when q∗
mC(Z,0) ≤ 1 − cZ/∆Iγ, namely
when there are positive incentives for harassment by the ﬁrst marginal “conditional” racist
when the minority population is at the steady state value with no “conditional” racists.
This is a situation in which “conditional” racist preferences can initially culturally invade a
majority with no-racist preferences. The phase diagram is then described by Figures 3a and
3b.
[Insert Figures 3a and 3b here]
In principle, there might be multiple steady states, alternating stable and unstable interior
steady states. It is immediate to obtain the following result
18Subscript C refers to the case of “Conditional” racists.
34Proposition 5 (Oppositional culture and segmentation)
(i) At a stable interior steady-state equilibrium (q∗
mC,γ∗
C), the prevalence of an oppositional
minority culture is more likely to arise, the lower the level of segregation in the society,
and the lower the cost of harassment. Also, at (q∗
mC,γ∗
C), the number of “conditional”
racists decreases with segregation and with the cost of harassment.
(ii) In the case of full cultural segmentation (i.e. d = 0), the prevalence of an oppositional
minority culture is more likely to arise, the lower the percentage of ethnic minorities
in the society while the number of “conditional” racists decreases with the percentage
of ethnic minorities in the society
7.2 “Unconditional” racists
If now racist preferences are explicitly against any minority member (and not only against
oppositional minority individuals), then majority individuals endowed with such preferences
will always undertake the harassment action Z when matched with a minority person. The
previous model of cultural evolution fully applies, except that the marginal incentives of
cultural transmission inside the majority group are modiﬁed in the following way:
∆VR(qm,t) = ∆Iγ − cZ and ∆VNR(qm,t) = cZ
As can be seen, these marginal incentives do not depend anymore on the frequency 1−qm of
oppositional individuals in the minority group. It is then immediate to see that the interior









NC = 1 −
cZ
∆Iγ










There is indeed more cultural polarization (i.e. more oppositional minority individuals and
more racist individuals) between the majority and the minority groups when racist prefer-
ences of the majority group are unconditionally against minority individuals than when they
are only against oppositional minority individuals.
19The subscript NC refers to the case of “Non-Conditional” racists.
358 Discussion of the results: Empirical and policy im-
plications
8.1 Our main results
By developing a dynamic model that interacts cultural transmission and socialization in-
side the family, peer eﬀects and social interactions, and identity choice, we have found the
following main results:
(i) The prevalence of an oppositional culture in the minority group can be sustained if
and only if there is enough cultural segmentation in terms of role models (d small enough),
and/or the size of minority group is large enough (qb large enough), and/or the degree of
oppositional identity it implies is high enough (i.e. Φ(.) and Io high enough), and/or the
socio-economic opportunity cost of the actions it prescribes is small enough (i.e. U small
enough). Also in this steady-state equilibrium, the oppositional minority families exert more
cultural transmission eﬀort than the mainstream minority families (Proposition 1);
(ii) The lower is the segregation (i.e. higher s) and/or the lower is the cultural segmen-
tation (i.e. higher d) between the minority and majority groups, the higher (resp. the lower)
is the socialization eﬀort of oppositional (resp. mainstream) parents (equations (25) and
(26)). Furthermore, a higher s implies a higher prevalence of an oppositional culture while
the eﬀect is ambiguous for d (Proposition 2 and Corollary 4);
(iii) The intensity of identity to an oppositional culture is stronger, the larger the socio-
economic opportunity cost U of the actions it prescribes. Also, at least close to full cultural
segmentation (i.e. d ≃ 0), an increase in social integration (i.e. higher s) leads to a positive
impact on oppositional identity intensity (Corollary 3)).
(iv) The higher the level of harassment and the higher the number of racist individuals
in the society, the more likely an oppositional minority culture emerges (Proposition 3) and
even more so in an environment with less social segregation (i.e. higher s) (Corollary 5).
Moreover, the level of harassment is decreasing in the segregation level, i.e. it is increasing
in s (Proposition 4 and 5).
(v) Finally, the diﬀusion of “racist preferences” inside the majority group and the evolu-
tion of oppositional culture within the minority group are likely to be dynamic complements,
giving rise to multiplier eﬀects of changes of socio-economic parameters, and possibly to the
existence of multiple steady-state situations of assimilation and racism in society.
368.2 Empirical relevance
One of our key (policy-relevant) results is to show that desegregation may potentially back-
ﬁre in some instances, because they increase social interactions across types, and thus can
strengthen oppositional identities. This is an important result, which is strongly supported
by empirical evidence.
Indeed, the results from a study conducted by Thornton et al. (1990) reveal that struc-
tural characteristics inﬂuence the propensity of African American parents to engage in eth-
nic socialization. African American parents who were older, more educated, residing in the
Northeast, and who were married were more likely to engage in ethnic socialization. Addi-
tionally, those who lived in neighborhoods that were predominantly black were less likely to
socialize their children than those who lived in neighborhoods where half of the residents were
white. Hence, the greater the number of white people in the neighborhood the more likely
the parents were to engage in ethnic socialization (Thornton et al., 1990).20
Bisin et al. (2004) study the transmission of religion and evaluate the empirical relevance
of the dependence of marriage choices on the distribution of the population by religious group.
If our model is correct, this would imply that homogamy will be more prevalent in neigh-
borhoods where the religion in question is less prevalent. They estimate this idea using U.S.
survey data, over the period 1972-1996, and simulate the dynamics of the distribution of the
population by religious group. Their results suggest that the dependence of marriage rates
on the distribution of the population by religious trait displays substantial nonlinearities.
Once such nonlinearities are taken into account, they ﬁnd that ethnic minorities do, in fact,
segregate in marriage more intensely than majorities, and they socialize their children more
strictly. The observed marriage and socialization patterns are consistent with a strong pref-
erence by members of each religious group for having children who share their own religious
trait. They also show that when a group is a minority, marriage segregation and socialization
eﬀorts are increasing in the group’s population share. The reason is that the estimated costs
of socialization and marriage segregation are substantial for a minority. As a group grows
toward being a majority, marriage segregation and socialization eﬀorts become decreasing
in the group’s population share. The reason is that when a group population share is high,
social interactions favor homogamy and socialization, independent of the explicit eﬀort of
20Anthropologists have also observed that social groups seek to preserve their identity, an activity that
accelerates when threats to internal cohesion intensify. Thus, groups may try to reinforce their identity
by penalizing members for diﬀerentiating themselves from the group. The penalties are likely to increase
whenever the threats to group cohesion intensify; for an early analysis of this issues, see Whyte (1943).
37individuals and parents.21
More recently, using data on American teenagers, Fryer and Torelli (2010) test the “acting
white” phenomenon. They show that for white kids, the higher is the grade, the more popular
(in terms of the number of same-race friends) they are while, for black kids, this is true up
to a certain grade (3.48). A black student with a 4.0 grade point average has, on average,
1.5 fewer same-race friends than a white student with a 4.0. Another interesting result,
in line with the predictions of our model, is that black students in mixed-race schools (a
good proxy for neighborhoods) have a stronger identity (in terms of rejecting other blacks
with good grades) than in more segregated schools. In other words, racial diﬀerences in
the relationship between popularity and academic achievement are larger in predominantly
white schools relative to predominantly black ones.
Finally, using a unique UK dataset, the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities,
Bisin et al. (2010), ﬁnd that ethnic identity appears to be formed in social contexts in which
the minority ethnic trait is mostly “threatened” either directly by the actions of the majority
group (e.g., through explicit acts of rejection or harassment), or indirectly simply by being
exposed to the interaction with the majority norm of behavior in mixed neighborhoods.
8.3 Policy implications
Let us now discuss these results in terms of policy implications. If the objective of the gov-
ernment is to reduce oppositional identity behaviors in society because it creates tensions
between diﬀerent communities, our model predicts that it should reduce social segregation
(i.e. increase s), cultural segmentation (i.e. increase d) and better integrate ethnic commu-
nities socio-economically (i.e. increase the opportunity cost U of “deviant” behavior).
To reduce segregation, or, equivalently, to induce ethnic minorities to meet people from
the majority group, one could promote social mixing. Such policies, which have been imple-
mented in the United States, include school busing, forced integration of public housing, laws
barring discrimination in housing and employment, and Moving to Opportunity (MTO) pro-
grams, which relocates families from high- to low-poverty neighborhoods (and from racially
segregated to mixed neighborhoods). To reduce cultural segmentation, one could increase
mainstream role models among the minority group. In that case, positive discrimination or
Aﬃrmative Action could be an appropriate policy.22
21Relatedly, Bisin and Verdier (2000) provide many examples of the resilience of ethnic and other cultural
traits that can be explained by a similar mechanism, from the case of Orthodox Jews in Brooklyn to the
case of aristocrats in France.
22See Lang (2007), which gives a very nice overview of these policies in the United States.
38Our results (i), (ii) and (iii) indicate that these policies are not equivalent and may
not always give the desired results in terms of integration of minorities. Typically, result (i)
suggests indeed that less segmentation in terms of cultural socialization (higher d) and better
socio-economic integration (larger U) are likely to reduce the prevalence of oppositional
identity behaviors. On the other hand, result (ii) indicates that, when oppositional identity
parents are socially mixed with mainstream individuals (from the minority and majority
groups), they may overreact and put much more eﬀort in transmitting their oppositional
trait. This, in turn, may lead to more rather than less prevalence of oppositional behaviors.
As well, result (iii) points out to a possible “quantity-quality” trade-oﬀ between the
prevalence of an oppositional behavior on one side, and, on the other side, the identity
intensity attached to this trait. For instance, while better socio-economic integration (larger
U) reduces the prevalence of an oppositional cultural trait, it also tends to increase the
identity intensity attached to that trait, creating therefore more polarization between existing
cultural identities in the society. If identity polarization and extremism as such induce
additional social costs, this would have to be weighted against a lower frequency of such
oppositional behaviors in the population.
Results (iv) and (v) also show that, by promoting social mixing, some people from the
majority group may increase their harassment against the minority group.23 This reaction,
associated with an increased eﬀort of oppositional parents in transmitting their own trait,
could explain why the integration policies cited above have often had limited eﬀects and
have been opposed by the same minority groups (see e.g., Jacoby, 1998). For instance,
James Coleman, ﬁfteen years after the famous Coleman Report in 1966, which originally
proposed busing, admitted that, “the assumption that busing would improve achievement
of lower-class black children has now been shown to be a ﬁction;” (cited in Jacoby, 1999).24
Aﬃrmative Action policies (Holzer and Newmark, 2000, 2006) as well as MTO programs
(Ludwig et al., 2001, and Kling et al., 2005) have had positive but arguably small eﬀects.25
Of course, other aspects could explain why these policies did not work. For example, since the
MTO programs basically moved families from extremely poor neighborhoods to poor neigh-
borhoods (Quigley and Raphael, 2008) and involved separating families from their networks
of friends (De Souza Briggs et al., 2010), the small eﬀects of these programs say nothing
23This is supported by empirical evidence. See, in particular, Dustmann and Preston (2001), Rivera-Batiz
et al. (2002), Bowyer (2009) and Dustmann et al. (2010).
24The failure of the busing and other civil right policies is certainly also due to the whites’ ﬂight from
de-segregated schools and neighborhoods.
25Similarly, the Toronto housing program where adults were assigned as children to diﬀerent residential
housing projects (Oreopoulos, 2003) did not give the expected results in terms of education outcomes.
39about lack of beneﬁts from integration. Also, as pointed out by Loury (1995), Aﬃrmative
Action programs inherently portray blacks as victims, and can thus encourage oppositional
identities.
Two other interesting policies, both highlighted in Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005, pp.
570-571) and Akerlof and Kranton (2010, pp. 106-107), are the US government programs
Job Corps and Jobstart. Job Corps is a residential, education and training program for at
risk youth, ages 16 to 24. The important aspect of this program is that it takes the students
to training centers where they receive free room and board along with an intense training
program. The Job Start is a similar program with one major diﬀerence: it is nonresidential
and thus students stay at home and commute to a local training site. Job Corps had large
eﬀects by increasing earnings and reducing crime while Job Start showed nearly no signiﬁcant
eﬀects. This indicates that neighborhood eﬀects matter. From our model, this could indicate
that by taking away minorities from their initial neighborhood and putting them in a more
mixed neighborhood could positively aﬀect their outcomes.
Conversely, results (iv) and (v) also emphasize, in the debate on immigrants’ cultural
assimilation and integration, the importance of dynamic complementarities between, on the
one hand, the incentives for minority individuals to adopt mainstream value systems (“the
demand side of assimilation”) and, on the other hand, the propensity for people from the
majority group to feel secure and tolerate without prejudice and discrimination the presence
of minority groups around them (the “supply side of assimilation”). The fact that both
dimensions are closely inter-related has implications for the design and evaluation of public
policies in this area. Indeed, the aforementioned complementarities suggest that a shift of a
policy parameter (i.e. U, s or d on the “demand side”, or c the cost of harassment on the
“supply side”) generates multiplier eﬀects in the process of cultural integration and tolerance
in society. As a result, having perspective only limited to the side directly aﬀected by the
policy generates evaluation bias. Clearly, taking the other side as exogenous will lead to an
underestimate eﬀect of the full impact of the policy.
More generally, our results suggest that, while the diﬀerent integration policies imple-
mented in the US and in Europe26 seem to have small eﬀects, this might not be uniquely
due to the persistence of segregated neighborhood, but possibly also to the perverse eﬀects
of integration policies, which might induce more intense ethnic identities and stronger ethnic
26For instance, the creations of Zones of Educational Priority (ZEP) and the rehabilitation of bleak housing
projects in immigrant neighborhoods under the guise of urban policy (‘politique de la ville’) in France had
very limited eﬀects. See, for example, Bénabou et al. (2009) for an evaluation of the ZEP and Brubaker
(2001) who compares the diﬀerent ways of assimilating ethnic minorities in France, Germany, and the US.
40socialization eﬀorts on the part of ethnic parents and extreme behavior from some people
from the majority group (see the evidence cited above in Section 8.2).
There are also obvious beneﬁts of integration policies that have not been included in
our analysis. For instance, better socio-economic integration of ethnic communities generate
economic gains from trade and production. It may also promotes accumulation of human
capital of minority communities, with positive growth eﬀects in the economy. Similarly,
cultural integration may help the diﬀusion of “common preferences” which facilitates social
consensus on collective decisions and provision of public goods. A full normative discussion
of the integration policies would certainly have to take into account these dimensions but
this is beyond the scope of the present paper.
Far from supporting policies that establish segregated neighborhoods, this piece of work
presented a simple model of cultural evolution which may be a useful block to discuss some
issues related to minorities’ identity formation and development of oppositional cultures.
In particular, it showed that the eﬀect of mixed neighborhood on identity formation and
socialization might be perverse. This is particularly so if mixed neighborhoods are conducive
of explicit acts of rejection (such as harassment) on the part of the majority group.
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48Appendix: Proofs of all the propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. The interior steady-state equilibrium is deﬁned by (27), which









o) + (1 − τ
∗
o)d(1 − qb) = 0
The optimal eﬀort τ∗
i = τi(q∗
m) are deﬁned by (24) and since τ∗
m(1) = 0, evaluating (27) at
q∗
m = 1 yields:
 (1) = −(1 − d + dqb)τo(1) + [1 − τo(1)]d(1 − qb) = 0
As a result,  (1) < 0 if and only if:
d(1 − qb) < τo(1) (37)
i) Observe that, by (21), ro(1) = 0, Qo(1) = 1 and the optimal eﬀort τo(1) deﬁned by (24)
can be written as:
Θ
′(τo(1)) = Φ(αo(Io)) − U
As a result, condition (37) can be written as:
Θ
′ (d(1 − qb)) < Φ(αo(Io)) − U (38)
ii) Furthermore, by diﬀerentiating (27), we obtain:
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Therefore, at any interior steady-state equilibrium q∗
m such that  (q∗
































Now, from (27), we get:






























































m) < 0 at such q∗
m.
iii) Also:
 (0) = [1 − τo(0)]d(1 − qb) > 0
• Now suppose that:
Θ
′ (d(1 − qb)) < Φ(αo(Io)) − U
which implies that  (1) < 0 (see (38)). Then because of iii) and the continuity of
 (qm), there exists at least one q∗
m ∈ ]0,1[ such that  (q∗
m) = 0. At such point because
of ii) we have  ′(q∗
m) < 0 which implies that q∗
m is unique.
• Now, suppose on the opposite, that
Θ
′ (d(1 − qb)) > Φ(αo(Io)) − U
then  (1) > 0. Suppose that there exists an interior solution q∗
m ∈ ]0,1[ such that
 (q∗
m) = 0. Then, by the same token ii) , it should be unique and the continuity of
 (.) implies that, for all points qm > q∗
m, one has  (qm) < 0, contradicting the fact
that  (1) > 0.
It follows that a necessary and suﬃcient condition to have an interior (unique) steady
state q∗
m is condition (38)










m (1 − d + dqb)
≤ 0
which means that oppositional families exert more socialisation eﬀort than mainstream fam-
ilies.
Proof of Proposition 2. Using (22), (23), (25) and (26), let us write the function  (.),
deﬁned in (27), as depending on all the parameters, i.e.














































which has the sign of ∂ /∂v since ∂ /∂qm < 0. The ﬁrst two results follow from:
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since, in equilibrium, τ∗
m − τ∗
o ≤ 0.
Proof of Corollary 2. Assume that the socialization costs are convex enough, i.e.
bounded from below by some positive constant K : Θ′′(τi) > K, and consider then a marginal
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Consider now the sign of:
1 − τo −
qm (1 − qm)(∆Vm + ∆Vo)
K
Recalling that Θ′(τo) = qm∆Vm and given (39), we obtain:
1 − τo −
qm (1 − qm)(∆Vm + ∆Vo)
K






















Now, deﬁne the following function:





This function is such that for all x, ϕ′(x) < 0, and ϕ(x) > 1 − 2
Kx. Thus for K > 2, we get




is a suﬃcient condition for
1 − τo −
qm (1 − qm)[(∆Vm + ∆Vo)
K
> 0
Therefore, from (40) a suﬃcient condition for
∂q∗
m








[U + Ψ(αm(qm))][Φ(αo(qm) − U]
Φ((αo(qm)) + Ψ(αm(qm)))
<
[U + Ψ(αm(0))][Φ(αo(1) − U]
Φ((αo(0))
52using the fact that αm(qm) and αo(qm) are respectively decreasing and increasing in qm and




can be written as
[U + Ψ(αm(0))][Φ(αo(1)) − U]
Φ((αo(0))
< 1 (41)




Finally, it follows that
∂q∗
m
∂d > 0 for d ≈ 0 when parameters values satisfy (42) and K > 2.
Proof of Corollary 3. The proof is immediate and comes simply from the fact that
an increase in U has no direct impact on the probabilities Qi but negatively aﬀects the








































































































qb) = (1 − s + sqb)qm + s(1 − qm)
and ∂U



















1 + A(1 − s + sqb)
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* Z Z 0Figure 2b: Identity and harassment: Multiple equilibria
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